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PROCEED AT YOUR OWN RISK:
THE BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
John E. Matejkovic* and David A. Redle**
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good
and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the
institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search
for truth and its free exposition. 1

l. INTRODUCTION

Sex is a central part of human existence and as such is an appropriate
subject for academic consideration and discussion. In many school
districts, sex education classes begin in the latter years of elementary
school, and almost every high school includes some sex education, even
if only as a part of a general "health" class. Sex is an appropriate topic of
discussion in anthropology classes, sociology classes, and civics or
current events classes at the high school level. Similarly, sex is an
appropriate topic at the college level not only in anthropology and
sociology classes, but also in English composition classes and classes
dealing with human relations issues generally. Sex is an especially
appropriate topic in colleges of business when discussing a business's
human relations function or in business law classes reviewing equal
employment opportunity law.
Despite its appropriateness for discussion in an academic context,
sex can also be a difficult or contentious subject. Many schools have
adopted policies and guidelines related to sexual harassment and
professional behavior in and out of the classroom. Society is generally
very sensitive to issues of sexual abuse and harassment, and this often

*Assistant Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration, The University of
Akron, Akron, OH; J.D., The University of Akron, 1979.
**Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration, The University of Akron, OH;
J.D., The University of Akron, 1980; M.B.A., The University of Akron.
I. Am. Assn. of U. Profs., /940 Statement ofPrinciples on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm ( 1940).
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makes any academic discussion of sex-related issues a delicate matter.
2
Indeed, awareness of sexual harassment is increasing, as evidenced by
over 13,000 annual filings of sexual harassment claims since 1994 with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
3
corresponding state fair employment practice agencies.
While a discussion of sex-related issues may be an academic
necessity in some situations, instructors need to be aware that there is a
very fine line that may exist between a legitimate classroom discussion
and an offensive one. Of particular concern, especially in the current
climate of academia, is the fact that what an instructor believes may be a
legitimate classroom discussion may result in his or her loss of
employment with very little recourse. Sexual harassment especially
becomes a concern in the educational context when principles of sexual
harassment conflict with concepts of academic freedom.
As discussions of sex are often difficult and/or sensitive, two
germane questions arise: (1) When does classroom conduct or discussion
rise to the level of sexual harassment? (2) At what point is classroom
conduct or discussion protected under the rubric of academic freedom?
These are the issues and concerns discussed in this article.
This article begins in Part II with an analysis of the concept of
academic freedom recognizing that, despite its evolution, academic
freedom continues to be a concept that is somewhat vague and
undefined. The authors suggest that, at a minimum, academic freedom
includes the freedom to investigate and research topics without regard to
current atmospheres of political correctness or controversy, the ability to
engage in classroom behavior to convey information in a manner which
is professionally appropriate to the subject matter taught, and the ability
to discuss relevant, controversial issues in the classroom. In Part III of
this article we analyze sexual harassment and the legal protections
afforded in an academic context. This concept is considered from two
perspectives: (I) Title IX protections against a hostile work environment
or quid pro quo harassment; and (2) other tort protections related to
sexual harassment, such as negligent hire and negligent supervision. The
focus of Part IV examines the collision between the collision between the
concept of a hostile work environment and other tort protections related
to sexual harassment. Generally Parts III and IV offer a survey of the

2. While this paper focuses on sexual harassment, it is important to remember that unlawful
harassment can be found to occur on the basis of any legally protected classification (e.g., race,
religion, age, disability).
3. U.S. Equal Empl. Opportunity Commn., Sexual llarassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs
Combined: FY 1992 -FY 2004 (available at http://www.ceoc.gov/stats/harass.html) (last modified
Jan. 27, 2005 ).
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important case law in these areas. The authors conclude that educators
and educational institutions should be cautioned to proceed at their own
risk when utilizing sex and related subjects in the classroom.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM

While the phrase "academic freedom" has been used in many court
4
decisions, it remains a rather vague, undefined concept. Academic
freedom has evolved over time based upon application of constitutional
protections to students, faculty, and administrators of educational
institutions.
From the faculty or administrative perspective, this amorphous
concept of academic freedom evolved along with concepts of tenure or
under collective-bargaining agreements. While tenure does not provide
complete protection to faculty members for any activities in which they
might engage, it allows academics freedom to engage in a wide range of
intellectual activities, as tenure statutes usually guarantee employment
except in cases of incompetence, neglect of duty, immorality,
unsatisfactory performance, insubordination, or conviction of a felony,
5
drunkenness, or criminal behavior. While currently they seem clearly
unconstitutional as a violation of First Amendment rights, many states
had laws banning teachers who were members of the Communist Party,
6
advocated communism, or refused to sign oaths of loyalty. Though
many may argue that tenure can be a mixed blessing, it is clear that freed
from concerns about "unjust" terminations, faculty members are able to
engage in broader areas of academic pursuit as well as exercise of their
7
First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.
Although faculty may enjoy more liberties and independence in their
academic pursuits as a result of the development of academic freedom,
there is a dearth of cases and treatises attempting to provide a single,

4. This paper is not designed to provide a comprehensive discussion of the evolution or
parameters of "academic freedom." Readers interested in the history, evolution, or vagueness of
"academic freedom" arc directed to any number of other articles discussing the concept in more
detail, such as /Jcvclopnu!nls in the raw: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1048 (1968); Charles
Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. I 027 (I 969); J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of" the Firs/ Amendment," 99 Yale L.J. 25 I ( 1989); and
others.
5. 5}ee CaL Educ. Code Ann.~ 44932(a)(l)-(a)(ll) (2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. §22-63-301
(2005 ); Conn. Gen. Stat. ~I 0-151 (2004); Fla. Stat. ~ 231.36(3) (repealed 2003); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann.§ 3319.16 (Anderson 2006); S.C. Code Ann.~ 59-25-430 (2005) (also listing drunkenness and
use, sale, or possession of drugs).
6. CaL Educ. Code Ann. at§ 44932(a)(9), (a)( I 0).
7. Obviously. the First Amendment freedoms involved are only protected against state
action; a private school teacher might not find such protections available.
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clear, and universally accepted definition of academic freedom.
However, the concept of academic freedom is never clearly defined in
any particular court decision. It is often cited as a concept or a concern in
a particular case, but the United States Supreme Court has never clearly
defined what academic freedom is, nor who it protects.
It would seem that the concept of academic freedom exists to
promote broad latitude in not only the topics or subjects that should be
taught or considered in an academic setting, but also to provide wide
latitude in how those topics or subjects may be taught. As one
commentator notes, "Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine
[of academic freedom] floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull
8
does bamacles." As another commentator asks, "To whom does
9
[academic freedom] belong?" Many legal analysts agree that academic
freedom should guarantee First Amendment rights of freedom of
expression to the extent the exercise of those rights is consistent with the
normal activities of a university. Some commentators note that
recognized limitations such as "time and place" regulations may be
appropriate and permissible on the campus to ensure order, avoid
10
con fl 1ct, etc.
The authors of this article recognize the absence of support for a
universally accepted definition of academic freedom. For the purposes of
this paper, the authors define academic freedom to include the freedom
to investigate and research topics without regard to current atmospheres
of political correctness or controversy, the ability to engage in classroom
behavior to convey information in a manner which is professionally
appropriate to the subject matter taught, and the ability to discuss
relevant, controversial issues in the classroom.
The concept of academic freedom was generally recognized by the
United States Supreme Court as early as 1957, in Sweezy v. New
11
Sweezy involved an investigation of a professor by the
Hampshire.
New Hampshire Attorney General, pursuant to the state's Subversive
12
Activities Act. During the course of the investigation, Sweezy refused
to answer certain questions posed by the Attorney General, and was cited
13
for contempt. The contempt citation was upheld by the lower courts
o

8. Byrne, supra n. 4, at 253.
9. Julius G. Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Foreword: Academic Freedom in a Changing
Society, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1247, 1249 (1988).
I 0. E.g. Wright, supra n. 4, at I 041-46 ("I do not read the first amendment as granting rights
in a vacuum, but rather as granting rights that exist at a particular time and place.").
II. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
12. !d. at 236-38.
13. !d. at 244.
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but reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that the process involved
in the investigation violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
14
Amendment because it infringed Sweezy's First Amendment rights. In
oft-quoted language, the Court stated:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait-jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturit~ and understanding; otherwise our
5
civilization will stagnate and die.
Following the Court's general recognition of the protections of
academic
freedom,
subsequent decisions expanded teachers'
constitutional rights to engage in "outside" political activity in the mid16
1960s, in cases such as Johnson v. Branch,
Racklev v. School
17
and Williams v. Sumter School District. Us The most
District,
significant ruling in this regard was that of the United States Supreme
19
Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents in which the First Amendment
right of freedom of association was applied to teachers who belonged to
20
"subversive" organizations. Specifically mentioning academic freedom
for the first time, the Court found academic freedom to be a "special
21
concern of the First Amendment."
In fact, the Court noted that
academic freedom was necessary for the "robust exchange of ideas"
22
which should occur in an academic setting.
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) .... The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

!d. at 254-55.
!d. at 250.
364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966).
255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
385 U.S. 589 ( 1967).
!d. at 591.
!d. at 603.

22.

!d.
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multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection." Uniteq States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
3
(S.D.N.Y. 1943).

Subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court established that
academic freedom exists only in relation to the educational context
involved. For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
24
School District, school officials suspended a number of high school
students for wearing black armbands to the school in protest of the U.S.
25
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The lower courts had upheld the
suspensions on the basis that the school officials acted properly to
26
prevent any disturbances in the school and to maintain discipline. The
Supreme Court reversed, noting that no disturbance actually occurred
and the wearing of the armbands was "pure speech" protected by the
27
First Amendment. The Court noted that neither teachers nor students
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
28
schoolhouse gate." However, the Court also noted that public schools
29
may limit speech to promote educational goals.
Nineteen years later, the Court reminded educators that academic
freedom exists only in relation to the educational context involved. It
indicated in another decision that freedom of expression protections are
not the standard educators and administrators are to apply in the
dissemination of student expressions in school-sponsored expressive
activities (e<f·· a school newspaper). In Hazelwood School District v.
3
Kuhlmeier, a group of high school students challenged their principal's
decision to pull an article discussing teen pregnancy and the impact of
31
divorce from the school newspaper.
The principal's justification in
pulling the article was that what the students discussed "anonymously" in
32
the article could be identified. The Court noted that First Amendment
rights of high school students are not coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings. The Court went on to distinguish Tinker by
noting that the freedom of expression standard in that case is not the
same standard for determining when a school may lend its name and

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
2X.
29.
30.

!d.
393 U S. 503 ( 1969).
!d. at 504.
!d. at 504-05.
!d. at 505-06, 514.
!d. at 506.
/d. at 506-07.
484 U.S. 260 (1988)

31. !d. at 263.
32. !d.
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33

resources to the dissemination of student expression. The Court held
that the First Amendment is not violated when school officials exercise
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities, as long as those actions are reasonably
34
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
In a 1994 result analogous to Hazelwood School District, the Second
Circuit in Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free School District Board of
35
Education found no academic freedom protection for a teacher who
used a film strip showing nude men and women to demonstrate the
phenomenon of "persistence of vision" to a tenth grade mathematics
36
class. The court found that no First Amendment violation occurred,
relying in part on Hazelwood and noting that high school officials were
allowed to regulate "legitimate pedagogical concerns" based upon
37
consideration of the students' ages and levels of maturity.
When evaluating the Silano decision (i.e., at issue was the effect of
actions as related to high school students), it is notable that there are
fewer considerations of age or maturity taken into account in academic
freedom questions at the college or university level because generally
any students involved are adults. Many of the decisions involving
colleges or universities specifically address issues of sexual harassment
and academic freedom based upon the actions and discussions of
instructors in the classroom. Most court decisions addressing academic
freedom concerns hold that academic freedom provides protection only
when the questioned activities are relevant to the academic circumstance.
"The principle of academic freedom under the First Amendment serves
to protect the utterances in question only if they are germane to course
38
content as measured by professional teaching standards. " However, as
stated by the Ninth Circuit, "Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit
has determined what scope of First Amendment J)fotection is to be given
3
a public college professor's classroom speech.''
Further, while most academics may believe that academic freedom is
an individual or personal freedom, a more recent, and very significant,
federal court of appeals decision held that academic freedom applies only
to educational institutions, and not to individual instructors. In Urofsky v.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

!d. at 272-73.
!d. at 273.
42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994)
!d. at 721.
!d. at 722--23.
Bonnell v. /,orenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 2001 ).

Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College. 92 F.3d 968,971 (9th Cir. 1996).
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40

Gilmore,
six professors employed by various public colleges and
universities in Virginia challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
prohibiting any state employee from accessing or downloading sexually
41
explicit materials on any computer owned or leased by the state. The
first challenge by the professors was that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied to all state employees, which the court handily dismissed. The
court noted that the speech at issue was being regulated on a narrow
basis (i.e., the prohibition only applied to use of state computers, and did
not prohibit state employees from accessing or discussing any material
using their own computers, on their own time), and the First Amendment
concerns were outweighed by the state's legitimate interest in workplace
42
efficiency and maintaining a workplace free of sexual harassment.
The professors' second challenge was that the statute
unconstitutionally interfered with their First Amendment right of
academic freedom, as they would be prohibited from accessing
information regarding human sexuality that was germane to their
43
academic pursuits. In fact, one professor complained that the statute
effectively censored his web site, which contained information regarding
44
studies of sexuality, among other things.
After discussing the evolution of the concept of academic freedom in
the United States and noting that cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian
actually did not address academic freedom as a concept applicable to
45
individual teachers, the court held that more recent Supreme Court
decisions established that academic freedom meant that educational
institutions had leeway to determine what was to be taught, and in what
46
fashion. The court wrote:
Taking all of the cases together, the best that can be said for Appellees'
claim that the Constitution protects the academic freedom of an
individual professor is that teachers were the first public employees to
be afforded the now-universal protection against dismissal for the
exercise of First Amendment rights. Nothing in Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggests that the "right" claimed by Appellees extends
any further. Rather, since declaring that public employees, including
teachers, do not forfeit First Amendment rights upon accepting public
employment, the Court has focused its discussions of academic
40. 216F.3d401 (4thCir.2000).
4 I. !d. at 404.
42. See id. at 406, 409; see also id. at 422 (Luttig, J., concurring).
43. !d. at 409-10.
44. !d. at 410 n. 9.
45. !d. at412-14.
46. !d. at 414 (citing decisions in Regents o/the U. o/Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 ( 1978)
and Regents of' the U. o/Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (I 985)).
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freedom solely on issues of institutional autonomy. We therefore
conclude that because the Act does not infringe the constitutional rights
of public eJllployees in general, it also does not violate the rights of
professors.

Overall, academic freedom still remains a vague and ambiguous
concept that seems to receive recognition by the courts in a variety of
inconsistent, and often ill-defined, circumstances. While the concept has
received recognition and ratification from the United States Supreme
Court, questions still remain as to who is protected by academic freedom.
Even though there is substantial case law indicating that academic
freedom applies to individual professors, the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Urofsky casts some doubt as to whether academic freedom is an
individual professor's right or a right that extends only to educational
institutions. Likewise, as previously mentioned, the vagueness of the
concept of academic freedom, including its lack of a clear definition and
uncertainty regarding who is entitled to its protections, becomes more
problematic in connection with sexual harassment concerns.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Generally speaking, the law of sexual harassment arose from Title
48
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Initially, courts found that Title
VII was violated when instances of repeated, unwanted sexual advances,
derogatory comments, gestures, and similar conduct, were directly
49
related to obtaining employment, promotions, raises, etc.
This conce8t
5
is now more commonly referred to as quid pro quo sexual harassment.
In 1980, the EEOC expanded the definition of sexual harassment
beyond the quid pro quo form of harassment when it issued guidelines
setting forth a definition of sexual harassment that included the idea of a
51
"hostile working environment":
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual

47. !d. at 415 (footnote omitted).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
49. E.g. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 21 I, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (The court found Title
VII to have been violated when the plaintiff was fired after refusing her supervisors sexual advances.
"[R]espondeat superior does apply here, where the action complained of was that of a supervisor
[who has the authority] to hire, tire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or recommend
such actions .... "); see also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) (clearly
describing the "quid pro quo" concept).
50. Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career olQuid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 2 I Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Policy 307, 308 ( 1998).
51. 29 C.F.R. § I 604. I I (a) (2005).
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harassment when[:]
( 1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance ~5 creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.

The concept of hostile work environment was recognized and
enforced by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v.
53
Vinson. In 1993, the Court expanded an employer's liability for hostile
work environment sexual harassment by ruling that no diagnosed
psychological injury was required to state a claim where the conduct was
54
severe and pervasive and would be offensive to a "reasonable woman."

A. Title IX
The prohibition of unlawful discrimination and harassment, whether
quid pro quo or hostile working environment, is included in the
protections of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 which
states that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any edu~~tion program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance ....

Under Title IX, an aggrieved individual has a private right of action
56
against an offending institution, and it is clear that if any program of an
institution receives federal funds, the entire institution is subject to the
57
provisions of Title IX.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized the protections
afforded under Title IX. In 1992, the Court in Franklin v. Gwinett
58
County Public Schoo!s reiterated that Title IX provides an individual
basis for claims of sexual harassment or gender discrimination against
educational institutions as well as a basis for awarding monetary
59
damages.
In Franklin, the court considered the protections afforded

52. !d.
53. 477 U.S. at 67.
54. Harris v. ForkliftSvs .. lnc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993).
55. 20 U.S.C. ~ 1681(a) (2000).
56. Cannon v. U of" Chi, 441 U.S. 677, 717 ( 1979).
57. Civil Rights Restoration Act oj"I'Ni7, 20 U.S.C. § 1687.

58. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
59. /d. at 76.
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under Title IX for a female student who was harassed by a
60
teacher/coach.
The female student reported instances of sexual
conversations, forced kissing, and even coerced intercourse that occurred
61
on school premises. The teacher involved in this harassment ultimately
resigned, although the school personnel suggested the student not pursue
62
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the student
the matter.
63
and more
could recover monetary damages under Title IX,
importantly, affirmed the Title IX protections against sexual harassment.
Generally, enforcement of Title IX protections is assigned to the U.S.
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which can
terminate federal funding for educational institutions found to be in
64
In 1997, the OCR disseminated the "Sexual
violation of the law.
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
65
Other Students, or Third Parties" (hereinafter the Guidance).
The
Guidance specifically states that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act should
provide a framework for evaluating sexual harassment claims under Title
66
IX, and that Title IX prohibits quid pro quo and hostile environment
67
The Guidance also specifically notes that educational institutions
acts.
68
may be held strictly liable for instances of quid pro quo harassment,
just as courts have imposed strict liability under Title VII for cases of
69
quid pro quo sexual harassment.
In hostile environment claims, the Guidance imposes liability on
educational institutions where an employee of the institution appears to
be acting on behalf of the institution or is aided in carrying out the
70
harassment by hi:= or her position of authority. A constructive notice
71
standard applies to other hostile environment claims.
Courts have regularly held that Title IX imposes duties on
educational institutions to prevent sexual harassment of students in the

60. !d. at 63.
61. !d.
62. !d. at 64.
63. /d. at 76.
64. 20 U .S.C. 9 16R2 (2000).
65. 62 Fed. Reg. 12034(Mar. 13, 1997).
66. !d. at 12046 n. 2.
67. !d.
68. ld at 12039.
69. E.g. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 70-71 (clearly describing the "quid pro quo"
concept); see also Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807-08 (1998) (indicating in dicta
that affirmative defenses should be allowed for hostile environment cases, but not for quid pro quo
cases).
70. 62 Fed. Reg. at 12039 (Mar. 13, 1997).
71. !d. at 12039-40.
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same fashion that Title VII imRoses duties on employers to prevent
72
sexual harassment of employees. With regard to employee-to-student
sexual harassment the Su~reme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista
3
Independent School District, held that actual notice of the harassment
was necessary before an educational institution could be held liable
under Title IX, with the educational institution demonstrating "deliberate
74
indifference" to the situation (i.e., failing to act). The court specifically
rejected imposing liability on the basis of constructive notice (e.g., "the
institution should have known"), but further held that discriminatory
75
animus was not required.
Four justices dissented, noting that sexual
harassment by a teacher violated a duty the school assumed in return for
federal financial aid and the teachers had far ~reater authority over
7
students than employers had over employees.
Thus, the dissenters
noted, the standard for liability under Title IX should be at least roughly
the same as that used to impose employer liability under Title VII sexual
77
.
harassment cI mms.
Subsequently, though courts have applied an "actual notice"
requirement to encompass reports from persons other than the victim of
78
the sexual harassment,
the "deliberate indifference" standard has
proven somewhat more problematic. The Gebser decision indicates that
there must be almost a conscious decision to not remedy the
79
harassment,
while the Sixth Circuit has noted that "deliberate
indifference" arises when an educational institution turns a "blind eye" to
the situation it knew or should have known about, and which does
80
nothing to end the harassment.
Despite the vagueness of the "deliberate indifference" requirement, it
is clear that the courts have little difficulty allowing liability issues to
proceed to trial under Title IX where there is some form of notice of the

72. E.g. Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473,477 (9th Cir. 1998) ('Title Vll standards apply to
hostile environment claims under Title IX.").

73. 524 U.S. 274 ( 1998).
74. !d. at 290.
75. !d. at 289-91.
76. !d. at 297-99 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
77. !d. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
78. E.g. Massey v. Akron Ci(v Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743-44 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
("The Court held [in Gebser] that an education institution's liability will depend on a showing of
actual notice and deliberate indifference.").
79. 524 U.S. at 290-91.
80. !d. at 290. Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 262-63 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding that the District responded inadequately to the plaintiffs complaints of harassment); see
also Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Kinman v.
Omaha Pub. Sch. !Jist., 94 F.3d 463,467 (8th Cir. 1996)).
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harassment, and the institution does little or nothing to remedy it. In
fact, Chontos v. Rhea'IQ gives authority for the proposition that
"deliberate indifference" is a question of fact to be determined by a
83
jury. In Chontos, there was evidence showing the institution knew of a
professor's reputation of harassment, but did nothing to rectify the
84 I
..
. reqUirements
.
situation.
n contrast to the vagueness o fh
t e notice
un d er
Title IX, the affirmative defense available under Title VII gives
employers an incentive to act quickly to address and remedy complaints
85
of harassment.
B. Related Causes o_fAction

While to this point this article has focused on potential sexual
harassment liability under Title IX, educators should also be aware of
other bases for liability. In addition to the claims already considered,
victims of sexual harassment in an academic setting have been successful
in making tort-based claims against an educational institution based upon
86
theories of negligent supervision, negligent hiring, etc. Unsurprisingly,
the courts have not imposed tort-based liability on institutions where
there has been no notice of sexual harassment or any evidence in the
employee's ;ast that would indicate proclivities towards sexual
8
harassment.
To avoid the barriers of Title IX, or to increase the possibilities of
recovery, several cases impose liability pursuant to the Civil Rights Act
88
of 1871, 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter "Section 1983"). Section 1983
provides a procedure to vindicate violation of federally protected rights,

81. E.g. Massey. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (The court denied the defendant institution's motion
for summary judgment and found that the institution was put on notice via several complaints,
comments, as well as a long history of suggestive pedophilia conduct by the offender, thus fulfilling
the "deliberate indifference" requirement.).
82. 29 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
83. /d. at 938.
84. /d. at 936--37.
85. E.g. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (noting that the holding was adopted, in part, to
accommodate Title VII's basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers). Atlirmative
defenses are only available in cases where no tangible employment action was taken by the
employer against the employee. !d.
86. E.g Shante D. v. City of New York, 638 N.E.2d 962, 962 (N.Y. 1994) (The City of New
York was found to be the legal cause of plaintiffs injury because of the school's failure to provide
"requisite supervision.").
87. E.g. Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 462-63 (N.C. 1990) (Employer had no way of
knowing of defendant's pedophilic tendencies, since the person he used as a reference said nothing
about a previous assault and the recommendations contained no information indicating that the
defendant was a pedophile.).
88. E.g. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660 ( 1978 ).
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89

but creates no substantive rights.
It can be used in addition to, or
instead of, Title IX to impose liability in certain circumstances.
However, those circumstances must involve a clearly recognized,
federally protected right. As such, the Section 1983 cases that pertain to
Title IX issues generally involve acts of sexual assault, coerced
intercourse, and rape, which are usually state crimes.
Furthermore, defendants in Section 1983 actions are often protected
by a "good faith" based ~ualified immunity if they took some action in
9
To recover under Section 1983, the plaintiff
response to a complaint.
must show a "custom" of deprivation of constitutional rights by showing
a continual, widespread pattern of misconduct, or deliberate indifference
91
by the institution after receipt of notice of misconduct. Where there is
not a clearly protected right (e.g., in those instances which may constitute
hostile work environment sexual harassment), liability under Section
1983 may be difficult to establish.
Moreover, under the Eleventh Amendment, states have immunity
92
from suit in federal court.
If the educational institution is a "state
institution" (which would probably not apply to claims against private
colleges and universities), it must either consent to the suit by waiving its
Eleventh Amendment immunity or there must be a federal statute
explicitly waiving the state institution's Eleventh Amendment
93
immunity. In this type of case, Title IX should effectively become the
main basis for claims because Title IX conditions receipt of federal
financial aid on the institution expressly wmvmg its Eleventh
.
. 94
A men d ment 1mmumty.

89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
90. E.g. !lagan v. Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 5 I F.3d 4X, 51-53 (5th Cir. I 995) (Defendant's
actions were enough to protect him from liability, though those actions were not successful, as
"simple ineffectiveness is not enough to overcome qualified immunity.").
91. Larson ex rei. /,arson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing .Jane Doe A. v.
Spec. Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. I 990)); Colleen R. Courtade, What Constitutes Poli(v
or Custom for Purposes of Determining Liabili(v of' Local Government Unit under 42 U.S. CA. §
1983- Modern Cases, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 549, 558-559 (2005).
92. The Eleventh Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const.
amend. XI.
93. See e.g. Breen v. Tex. A&M U., 213 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771-72 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Will
v. Mich. Dept. of'St. Police, 491 U.S. 58,66 (1989)) (holding that because Texas had not waived its
sovereign immunity, nor has Congress abrogated state immunity in any other provision, that an
administrator of a student's estate was barred against federal suit against Texas A&M University due
to the Eleventh Amendment protections).
94. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000d-7(a)(J); Litman v. George Mason U., 186 F.3d 544,548,550,555 (4th
Cir. 1999); see also Klemencic v. Ohio State U., 10 F. Supp. 2d 91 I, 918 n. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(citing Franh v. Kentucf..y Sch.fi>r the Deaf: 142 F.3d 360 (6th C:ir. I 99X)).
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Clearly, sexual harassment is unlawful in the employment context
under Title VII and in the educational context pursuant to Title IX which
borrows some standards and concepts from Title VII. Protections against
quid pro quo and hostile working environment sexual harassment are
available and the OCR is charged with the responsibility of ensuring
such protections are enforced. Additionally, other theories of tort liability
(e.g., negligent retention, negligent hiring) are available as potential
causes of action for those against whom harassment is perpetrated.
However, sexual harassment becomes problematic in the educational
context where protections against sexual harassment conflict with the
concept of academic freedom. As was asked earlier, when does
classroom conduct or discussion become sexual harassment, or at what
point is the conduct or discussion protected under the rubric of academic
freedom?

IV. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Quid Pro Quo
In cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment, there are no issues of
academic freedom that interfere with the imposition of liability. Where
there is a tangible academic reward or benefit in exchange for sexual
favors, the courts have no problem holding at least the offending party
responst'bl e. 95
In addition to holding the offending party responsible for actions that
constitute sexual harassment, there are occasionally issues of vicarious
96
liability on the part of the institution employing the offender. One such
97
example, Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc., involved a student
98
seeking to become a licensed practical nurse.
One of the student's
instructors began what became an increasingly severe pattern of
harassment, starting with touching, then inappropriate comments about
her body (e.g., referencing to the student's "boobies" and "cha-chas"),
95. E.g. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dis/., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996) (Affirming the grant
of summary judgment against the offender for creating a hostile environment-rather than quid pro
quo sexual harassment. The employers were not held vicariously liable.).
96. E.g. Gehser, 524 U.S. at 290. See also Alexander v. Yale U., 459 F. Supp. I, 4 (D. Conn.
1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring)) ("inaction . . . does assume significance, for on refusing to
investigate, the institution may sensibly be held responsible for condoning or ratifying the
employee's invidiously discriminatory conduct"); Crandell v. N.Y. College of Osteopathic Medicine,
87 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
97. 267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
98. !d. at 682.
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and eventually leading to a quid pro quo proposition - which she
99
refused. When the instructor gave the student a failing grade, she filed
100
She
a complaint with the Kentucky Commission for Human Rights.
subsequently communicated her complaints directly to the school when it
inquired regarding her Kentucky Commission for Human Rights
. 101
cIatm.
Eventually, the plaintiff sued the school in United States District
102
Court, alleging violations of Title IX.
Although the court held that a
valid quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment was stated when the issue
was whether the plaintiffs failure was a direct result of her refusal of the
instructor's proposition, it granted the motion for summary judgment on
the quid pro quo claim because the school did not have sufficient
103
notice.
Indeed, the plaintiff went to all her classes and made no
104
And, the court also
complaints to the school prior to the end of class.
granted the motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs hostile
.
. 105
env1ronment
c l atm.
Another example of potential vicarious liability for an institution that
106
employs an offender can be found in Gyda v. Temple University.
The
Gyda court held that the plaintiff alleged a viable quid pro quo claim
when he and his supervising professor mutually terminated a romantic
107
relationship.
The supervising professor subsequentP' adopted a
10
The plaintiff
hostile, rude, and harassing manner toward the student.
raised the issue that the supervising professor had made his life more
difficult in the laboratory. Noting Title VII precedent where quid pro quo
liability had been imposed merely when the work life became "more
difficult," the court held a valid quid pro quo claim under Title IX had
109
been made, and the school had potential liability under such a claim.

B. Hostile Environment
Like quid pro quo claims, hostile environment sexual harassment

9'1. !d.
100. !d. at 683.
101. !d.
I 02. !d. at 681.

I 03. !d. at 689.
I 04. !d. at 687.
105. !d.

106. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7099 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2000).
107. !d. at *5.
I 08. !d. at** 5, 17, 19-20.
109. !d. at *20 (citing Walker v. Mac(rugals Bargains. Closeouts, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18136 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1'194)).
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claims often do not involve issues of academic freedom. Hostile
environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct
have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's P.erformance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
.
110
environment.
A rather egregious example of a hostile environment claim in which
a plaintiff attempted to attach liability to the employer of the offender is
111
Wills v. Brown University.
Wills was a student who went to talk to
one of her professors about difficulties she was having with class
112
During the discussion with her professor, the two prayed,
materials.
and the professor pulled the student onto his lap twice and fondled
113
During the course of the university's investigation the professor
her.
114
admitted to most of the allegations made by the student.
The plaintiff
filed a written complaint with the associate dean and her complaint was
115
As a result, the professor was placed on probation and a
investigated.
written reprimand was issued cautioning him to avoid any such actions in
116
The associate dean deemed these disciplinary actions
the future.
appropriate because he believed that this was the professor's first
117
As it turned out, not only was this not the professor's first
offense.
such offense, but it was not his last offense, either. He was terminated
118
two years later for harassing other female students.
The plaintiffs suit named both Brown University and the professor,
and sought recovery under Title IX for hostile environment sex
119
Plaintiff also alleged a
harassment and quid pro quo sex harassment.
number of tort-based claims: assault and battery; negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention, and entrustment; and intentional and negligent
120
An additional claim was stated under
infliction of emotional distress.
r
d'
.
.
.
state statute tOr sex tscnmmatwn. 121
A default judgment was entered against the professor in the amount

110. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 467 (citing Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474 (8th
Cir. 1995)).
I II. 184 F.3d 20, 23-24 (I st Cir. 1999).
112. /d. at 23.
113. /d.
114. !d.
115. /d.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

!d.
/d.
!d. at 24.
/d.
!d.
/d.
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of $275,000.
Brown University's motion for summary judgment was
granted as to the claims of negligent hiringf retention, and intentional and
23
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
And at trial, at the end of
plaintiffs case, the court granted Brown University's motion for directed
verdict as to the quid pro quo and assault and battery claims, allowing
only the negligent supervision and hostile environment claims to go to
124
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brown University on
the jury.
125
.
both c Imms.
The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court's judgment in
126
all respects.
With respect to the Title IX claims, the court found little
credible evidence that the Universi~ had any notice of improper conduct
1 7
prior to the plaintiffs complaint.
And once the University received
the plaintiffs complaint, an investigation and remedial measures
128
followed, thereby overcoming the "deliberate indifference" standard.
Another example where a hostile environment claim was made
against both the offender and his employer is the case of Frederick v.
129
Simpson College.
In Frederick, the plaintiff was a Russian immigrant
130
enrolled in school to obtain a teaching certificate.
One of the
plaintiffs professors, Steven Rose, allegedly created a hostile
environment by use of vulgar language, general comments concerning
131
sexual activity, and staring at the plaintiff, among other things.
After
the final in-class meeting, the plaintiff was invited by Rose to call him at
132
any time if she needed anything.
Subsequent to the class ending, the
plaintiff and Rose had several conversations, some initiated by the
133
plaintiff, and they even met off of school premises.
Even though the plaintiff and Rose maintained a relationship long
after the class had ended, with Rose writing a number of reference letters
at the plaintiffs request and the plaintiff giving Rose a book and a letter
as gifts, the court found that such activities were insufficient to give the
134
Further, the court dismissed the
administrators actual notice.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
12g.

/d.
!d. at 25.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 27.
/d. at 26-27.
/d. at 27.
149 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Iowa 200 I).
!d. at 828.
!d. at 829-30.
!d. at 830-31.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133. !d. at 830-32.
134. !d. at 838-39.
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plaintiffs Title IX claim against the college because the college had
135
Indeed, the court found
undertaken an investigation of the allegations.
that, although the investigation may not have been very thorough, it was
enough to disprove the deliberate indifference standard mandated by
136
Gebser.
Yet another attempt to attach liability to both the offender and his
137
In Zimmer, the plaintiff
employer is Zimmer v. Ashland University.
was a student on the Ashland University swim team who alleged that her
swim coach repeatedly made sexual comments to her. The swim coach
told her "that she looked good in a blue bathing suit on different
occasions" and performed massages on her despite her request that the
138
The student and other
college's athletic trainer treat her ailments.
members of the women's swim team met with the athletic director to
complain about the coach, with the result that the athletic director
139
informed the coach that his actions were unacceptable.
Even after the meeting with the athletic director, the plaintiff alleged
that the coach made at least three more inappropriate comments to
140
her.
The plaintiff then transferred to another university because she
141
Even
did not want to be on the swim team with that particular coach.
though the court noted that the plaintiffs claim of a hostile educational
environment was not as severe as in other instances, the court still held
that the evidence of the inappropriate conduct, given that the plaintiff
transferred to another college in order to avoid experiencing any further
inappropriate conduct, was sufficient to state a hostile environment claim
. v10
. Iatwn
. o fT.It Ie IX . 142
m
The court further held that because the plaintiff had complained to
the athletic director who had authority to remedy the situation, but who
failed to do more than issue a vague reprimand, the university's motion
143
The plaintiffs
for summary judgment based on Gebser was denied.
tort-based claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress were
dismissed against the university and athletic director, but were
144
The plaintiffs tort-based claims against
maintained as to the coach.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

!d. at 840.
!d. at 840.
200 I U. S. Dist. LEX IS 15075 (N. D. Ohio Sept. 5, 200 I).
/d. at **5-6.
!d. at **7-X.
!d. at *8.
/d.at**89.
!d. at **25 32.

143. /d. at ** 18 19. 21 25. 32.
144. !d. at **35, 37.
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the university for negligent hiring were similarly dismissed, but a tort
145
claim of negligent retention was allowed to proceed.
C. Classroom Academic Activities

In considering the above cases, it is important to keep in mind that
they all involved rather egregious violations. In an employment context,
there would be little dispute about whether sexual harassment occurred,
in contrast to the academic setting, where there may not be a basis for
such a position. Because of the rather clear factual circumstances, there
are generally no issues of academic freedom to consider. However,
academic freedom does become a central issue where the factual
circumstances concerning the alleged sexual harassment are based solely
on conduct that occurs in, and is germane to, classroom academic
activities.
One example in which academic freedom was at the center of the of
the factual circumstances of the alleged sexual harassment is Cohen v.
146
San Bernardino Valley College.
The plaintiff Cohen was a tenured
professor at the College, who had taught English and film studies since
147
Over the years, Cohen had assigned provocative essays to his
1968.
148
students and also played "devil's advocate" during class discussions.
In the spring of 1992, Cohen stated in class that he wrote for Hustler and
149
Playboy magazines and read some articles aloud.
Cohen then assigned
150
One of his students
the class to write essays defining pornography.
was offended by the language used in class and by Cohen's repeated
151
The student asked for an alternative
focus on topics of a sexual nature.
152
assignment to the "define pornography" paper, but Cohen refused.
The student stop~ed attending Cohen's class and received a failing grade
53
She then filed a complaint about Cohen's statements
for the semester.
and conduct to the chair of the department, asserting that Cohen had
!54
sexually harassed her.
After an administrative hearing, the College's grievance committee
found that Cohen had violated the College's policy against sexual

!d. at *41.
92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996).
!d. at 970.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
153. !d.
154. !d.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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harassment.
Ultimately, Cohen was found guilty of creating a hostile
.
.
. the c1assroom. 156 c ohen was reqmre
. d to
earnmg
environment
m
I
provide a syllabus concerning his teaching style, purpose, course content,
and methods; attend a sexual harassment seminar within ninety days;
undergo a formal evaluation procedure in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement; become sensitive to particular needs and
backgrounds of his students; and modify his teaching strategy when it
became apparent that his techniques created a climate which impeded the
157
students' ability to learn.
Cohen was also advised that additional violation of the sexual
harassment policy could result in further disciplinary measures, including
158
suspension or termination.
Cohen sued the College under Section
1983, claiming that the Colle~e's actions violated his First Amendment
15
rights to academic freedom.
The District Court decided Cohen's claim
on the basis that the college's sexual harassment policy was
160
unconstitutionally vague.
In particular, the court noted that until the
student complained, Cohen's teaching style had apparently been
considered pedagogically sound and within the bounds of teaching
161
methodology permitted at the College.
Since Cohen's teaching style
went unchallenged for years, the court held that it was unconstitutional to
punish him on the basis of a policy that did not clearly advise him what
162
was and was not acceptable.
Remanding the case back to the district court, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court should order the college to remove the disciplinary
decision from Cohen's personnel file and enjoin the College from further
163
implementing any discipline based upon the vague harassment policy.
But, it further noted that the individual defendants were protected by the
qualified immunity under Section 1983 because they acted upon a
reasonable, good faith belief that their actions in disciplining Cohen were
164
consistent with the law.
Even though Cohen's academic freedom
claim was vindicated, he received no damages from the courts-a hollow
victory, at best.

155. !d. at 971.
156. !d.
157. !d.
158. !d.
159. !d. at 969.
160. !d. at 971-72.
161 !d. at 972.
162. !d.
163. !d.
164. !d. at 973.
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While not involving a sexual harassment claim, another case
provides an important example of how an instructor's academic freedom
may be recognized with no remedy for the disregard of such freedoms. In
165
Dube v. State University of New York,
the court upheld a professor's
academic freedom to teach that Zionism was a form of racism in a class
166
called "The Politics of Race."
The class addressed three
manifestations of racism: Nazism in Germany, Apartheid in South
167
Africa, and Zionism in Israel.
A complaint about the contents of the
course was filed by a visiting professor from Israel who wrote a letter to
the dean of the college, objecting to Zionism being characterized as
168
racism.
An investigation was undertaken by the executive committee
of the University Senate, which unanimously determined that the
169
plaintiffs teachings were within the bounds of academic freedom.
Nevertheless, substantial public furor grew over the contents of the
170
class.
The plaintiff became eligible for tenure during the 1983-84
academic year, and the peer committee voted six to one in favor of
recommending tenure, and voted four to three in recommending
171
promotion to associate professor.
However, the dean of the College of
Humanities and Fine Arts recommended that the plaintiff be denied
tenure and promotion based upon the plaintiffs alleged failure to provide
the quantity and quality of written scholarship required by the college;
.
. ' s pres1"dent concurre d. 172
the umvers1ty
The plaintiff filed suit under Section 1983, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages against the individual defendants and the
University, as well as a permanent injunction that would require the
173
defendants to appoint him to a tenured position.
The plaintiffs
complaint alleged that the College's denial of tenure "based on his
discussion of controversial topics" violated his First Amendment
academic freedoms guaranteed in his contract, and the tenure review
174
process denied him of his due process rights.
The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
Dube's First Amendment claim, holding that the College's actions in

165. 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990).
166.

!d. at 589.

167.

!d.

168
169.

!d.
!d. at 590.

170.

!d.

171.

!d. Dube requested and was granted a postponement until 1984 85. !d.
!d. at 591.

172.
173.
174.

!d. at 592.
!d. at 58'!.
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denying tenure to the plaintiff were objectively unreasonable and
175
With
violated the plaintiffs First Amendment academic freedoms.
regard to qualified immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the court
ruled that it was not available to the defendants because qualified
immunity does not shield government officials, acting in their individual
176
capacities, whose conduct violates plaintiffs constitutional rights.
Thus, the court recognized the validity of the plaintiffs academic
freedom claims, even in the face of qualified immunity.
As an example of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, the
177
plaintiff in Silva v. University of New Hampshire
used a sexual
analogy to describe the concept of "focus" in writing as part of a
178
freshman English class on technical writing.
The plaintiffs statement
was:
I will put focus in terms of sex, so you can better understand it. Focus
is like sex. You seek a target. You zero in on your subject. You move
from side to side. You close in on the subject. You bracket the subject
and center on it. Focus connects experience and language. You and the
179
. b
su bJect ecome one.

Two days later, during the second technical writing class, the
plaintiff used a belly dancer's definition of belly dancing to illustrate
how a good definition combined a general classification with concrete
180
specifics in a metaphor.
The plaintiff had used both examples in his
classes on numerous occasions and the belly dancing simile for at least
181
two decades.
Six students from the class met with an associate professor
subsequent to the technical writing class, and complained of sexual
182
harassment.
The University investigated and determined that the
plaintiffs comments violated its sexual harassment policr As a result,
18
the plaintiff was suspended without pay for one year. · The plaintiff
filed suit against the university under Section 1983 and under various
.
184
state Iaw cIatms.
The district court granted the professor's motion for a preliminary

175. !d. at 594-98, 600.
176. !d. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982)).
177. 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H 1994).
17S. !d. at 298-99.
179. !d. at 299.
I SO.

!d.

181. !d.
182. !d. at 300.
183. !d. at 31 I.
184. !d. at 297.
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. .
.
185 h I .
.
. ' s suspensiOn.
. 186 Th e court a Iso
mJunctJon,
a tmg th e umvers1ty
found that the professor had a protected liberty interest in his
187
because the plaintiff's comments were not of a sexual
employment
nature, but in fact, were legitimately related to the pedagogical concern
of explaining the topic at hand in a fashion the plaintiff believed the
188
The determinative factor in this case was
students could comprehend.
the intent and use of the allegedly offensive language. The plaintiff had
specifically chosen an analogy which he believed the students could
relate to and which was directly related to his legitimate pedagogical
. .
I
189
concern o f expI ammg a c assroom concept.
Another example involving a claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment can be found in Gretzinger v. University of Hawaii
190
Professional Assembly.
In Gretzinger, the plaintiff was a ~tudent of
Professor Lamb and claimed hostile environment sexual harassment
during the course of a classroom discussion of rape and sexual
191
harassment.
The student further alleged that Lamb sexually assaulted
192
her (although no specifics were ever identified) on several occasions.
When the student complained to the University, an investigation ensued,
193
resulting in the dismissal of her charges.
The student subsequently filed suit, claiming violations of Title IX,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1983
violations, and a tort-based claim of intentional infliction of emotional
194
Prior to trial, the university settled, but the suit proceeded
distress.
195
The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff's federal
against Lamb.
claims, noting that the plaintiff had made an allegation under Title IX of
. 196
. . an d h ad prove d no reta 1'mtJon.
reta I1atwn
Similarly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim on
the plaintiff's admission (as she was acting pro se) that such claim was

185. !d. at 326-27.
I 86. !d. at 332.
187. !d. at 317-18.
18K /d.at312-13,316.
189. The court granted summary judgment to the university on the plaintiff's procedural due
process claims that challenged the adequacy of the "informal" sexual harassment procedures, id. at
321, and to several individual defendants on the plaintiff's breach of contract claims as the
individual defendants were not party to the contract (collective bargaining agreement) in question.
!d. at 329.
190. 1998 U.S. App. LEX IS 15370 (9th Cir. July 7, !998).
191. !d. at *2.
192. !d.
193. /d.
194. !d.
195. !d. at *3.
196. !d. at *7.
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based on the Title IX retaliation claim and, since the plaintiff had not
proved Title IX retaliation, dismissal of the Section 1983 claim was also
197
appropriate.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs claims and further agreed "that detailed
instructions on the law of sexual harassment would have merely
198
confused the jury as to the elements of an emotional distress claim."
Of some interest is the fact that Professor Lamb also filed suit
against the University of Hawaii, alleging a violation of his First
Amendment rights based upon the University's investigation of the
199
sexual harassment allegation, but was unsuccessful.
The Ninth Circuit
held that the University was immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment and further held that the individual defendants had a
qualified immunity which precluded the imposition of liability under
Section 1983, based upon the fact that they had a duty to investigate the
sexual harassment claim, and the courts had yet to define what the
200
professor's First Amendment rights were under the circumstances.
Another notable holding discussing the sitftnificance of hostile
2
In Vega, a professor
environment sexual harassment is Vega v. Miller.
was reprimanded as a result of an exercise demonstrating the concept of
202
"clustering" during a composition class.
Clustering is a form of
brainstormin§: exercise where the topic to be discussed is written on a
2 3
Various terms offered by class members are also recorded
blackboard.
on the blackboard and "clustered" into groups so that students might
appropriately write on the topic in such a way as to avoid redundant
204
terms or concepts.
The exercise at issue occurred during the last ten minutes of the
205
plaintiffs class.
The subject suggested by the students was "sex,"
206
which Professor Vega understood to be "sex and relationships."
As
the students began to call out words and terms relevant to the subject,
207
some of them began to use crude and vulgar language.
Vega

197. !d. at **8~9.
198. !d. at *8.
199. Lamh v. U. of Haw., 1998 U.S. App. LEX IS I 0775 at **2, 6~7 (9th Cir. May 28, 1998).
200. !d. at **2-3, 5-7.
201. 273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001).
202. !d. at 462-63.
203. !d. (Plaintiff carried out a "free-association exercise called 'clustering,' in which students
were invited to select a topic [which was written on the black board], then call out words related to
the topic, and finally group related words together into 'clusters.'").
204. !d.
205. /d.at476,480.
206. !d. at 463.
207. !d.
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cautioned his students that the use of some of the terminology they were
suggesting was not appropriate for most people and should be used rarely
208
or not at all.
Interestingly enough, none of the students or their parents ever
complained about the exercise; instead the issue came to the attention of
the college administrators when th~ were investigating a complaint of a
2
student on an unrelated matter.
When the college administrators
became aware of Vega's exercise, a meeting was arranged between the
210
plaintiff and the vice president of academic affairs.
The plaintiff handed over copies of his lesson plans and his notes on
the exercise that included many of the provocative topics and terms that
had been shouted out by the students during the course of the
211
exercise.
The plaintiff was terminated for his "reliance on sex as a
212
theme and his use of sexually-explicit vocabulary."
The plaintiff filed suit in U.S. District Court, alleging a Section 1983
violation based upon infringement of his First Amendment rights of
213
academic freedom.
The trial court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and the
214
College administrators appealed.
While the Second Circuit reversed
the trial court's decision and remanded the case with specific instructions
that the case be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, the court
specifically noted that the plaintiff had been disciplined for permitting a
215
classroom exercise initiated for legitimate pedagogical purposes.
However, in light of the unclear nature of the scope of academic
freedom at the time of the College's actions, the court held that qualified
immunity did attach in each of the cases as the administrators were
acting within what they believed were legal parameters then in
216
existence.
Thus, even if Professor Vega's First Amendment rights
were violated, as the classroom exercise was initiated for a legitimate
217
218
pedagogical purpose,
he still had no recourse against the College.

208. !d. Vega did not caution his students during the exercise, but after the exercise. /d.
209. /d.
210. !d.

211. !d.
212. !d. at 463-64.
213. /d.at464.
214. !d. at 464-65 (referring to those appellant defendants only).
215. !d. at467. 471.
216. !d. at 468-71.
217. !d. at471 n. 13.
218. See also Bonnell, 241 F.3d at R02-03 (wherein a college professor was denied injunctive
relief from disciplinary action for routinely sprinkling profanity into classroom discussions as part of
his normal conversation).
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As all of these cases illustrate, even in the name of academic
freedom, educators must proceed with caution when utilizing
controversial subjects, such as sex, as teaching tools in the classroom.
Indeed, these cases demonstrate the tension between the protections
against sexual discrimination and harassment and the principles of
academic freedom.
V. CONCLUSION

Definitions and applications of both concepts of academic freedom
and sexual harassment have evolved significantly in recent decades and,
no doubt, will continue to transform even further. What is abundantly
clear is that the protections of academic freedom come into conflict with
protections granted to students under Title IX against sexual
discrimination and harassment. Indeed, as the court in Bonnell recited:
Since the precise frontier between academic freedom and sexual
harassment remains to be defined by the courts case by case, a
teacher ... may be able to find safety and comfort under the [First]
Amendment only if the words uttered are found in appropriate textual
materials and the utterances are pertinent to discussion of those
materials. Beyond this point, the te~y~er enters uncharted territory and
proceeds at his or her own risk ....

Obviously, cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment are unlawful, as
are those cases of hostile environment sexual harassment that involve
egregious facts, such as touching, groping, and other offensive activities
which occur outside the classroom.
When the sexual harassment complaint is based upon in-class
activities, an inevitable collision occurs between academic freedoms and
sexual harassment protections. Based upon review of the case law, it
would appear that where any sexually oriented discussion is specifically
and legitimately related to a valid pedagogical end, the academic
freedom claims must prevail. It is when no legitimate pedagogical end is
involved that the sexual harassment protections will prevail.
It should also be apparent that individual professors may find
enforcement of their academic freedoms problematic as, for the most
part, their claims will be based upon Section 1983, which recognizes a
qualified immunity for the actions of university or college administrators
when they are acting in good faith, based upon their understanding and
application of the law. In addition, where administrative personnel seek

219. !d. at 804 (citing a memorandum by Defendant written March 4, 1998, issuing a warning
to Plaintitl).
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to enforce sexual harassment policies, there is the added concern of
vagueness, which may make the policy indefensible under the First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations.
Thus, while sex may be a central part of human existence and an
appropriate subject for academic discussion and learning, and given the
recent case law, educators should act cautiously and proceed at their own
risk when exploring the line between academic freedom and sexual
discrimination and harassment.

